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12Abstract This paper seeks to explain why mainstream analytic philosophy lost
13interest in the philosophy of history. It suggests that the reasons why the philosophy
14of history no longer commands the attention of mainstream analytical philosophy
15may be explained by the success of an ontological backlash against the linguistic
16turn and a view of philosophy as a form of conceptual analysis. In brief I argue that
17in the 1950s and 1960s the philosophy of history attracted the interest of mainstream
18analytical philosophers because the defence of the autonomy of historical
19explanation championed by the likes of Collingwood, Dray, Melden Winch, Von
20Wright and others was in tune with the predominant conception of philosophy as a
21conceptual enterprise concerned primarily with clarifying different explanatory
22practices. As this conception of philosophy as an essentially conceptual enterprise
23became recessive, the purely methodological non-reductivism advocated by defenders
24of the autonomy of history was accused of ontological escapism and the discussion
25concerning the autonomy of psychological explanations became the province of the
26philosophy of mind and action.
27Keywords Ontological backlash . Philosophy of history . Philosophy of action
29In mid-twentieth century thought the philosophy of history occupied centre stage in
30key philosophical debates, such as that concerning the nature of action and event
31explanation. Since the study of history appeared to require an investigative method
32that is qualitatively different from that of the natural sciences, the philosophy of
33history became the battleground for a discussion of the action/event distinction in the
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34guise of a debate for and against methodological unity in the sciences. Whilst in the
35mid-twentieth century the philosophy of history provided an important forum for the
36discussion of problems at the very heart of philosophy, the second half of the century
37has witnessed a steady decline of interest in this sub area. Thus, whilst the debate
38about the nature of explanation in the natural and human sciences, the so-called
39verstehen/erklären debate, was a staple diet for undergraduates in the 1960s, this
40debate now rarely features on the undergraduate syllabus. A cursory look at
41publications in analytical journals also shows that the debate about the nature of
42rational and causal explanations is now firmly lodged in the philosophy of mind and
43action, not in the philosophy of history or the philosophy of social science.
44This paper seeks to explain why mainstream analytic philosophy lost interest
45in the philosophy of history. My key claim is that the declining interest in the
46philosophy of history is linked to the return of a metaphysical conception of the task
47of philosophy. Mid-twentieth century philosophy was dominated by a conception of
48philosophy as conceptual analysis. On this understanding of philosophy the task of
49the philosopher was to reflect on the explanatory practices of different disciplines
50and tease out, from these, the regulative principles that govern them. This conception
51of philosophy provided a fertile ground for the methodological discussions
52concerning the nature of explanation in the human and natural sciences that took
53place in the philosophy of history. The second half of the century, by contrast,
54witnessed a return of “real” metaphysics, a sort of ontological backlash against the
55idea of philosophy as a form of conceptual analysis. Tired of talk about talk, many
56philosophers in the latter half of the century turned to substantive questions.
57Moreover, this return of ontology in the latter half of the century was not a mere
58adjustment of emphasis within the framework of Kant’s Copernican turn, in the
59manner of phenomenology’s slogan “back to the things themselves”. The return of
60ontology in the latter half of the century was a return of real metaphysics, a
61significant departure from Kant’s transcendental turn as well as from the linguistic
62turn. The declining interest in the philosophy of history is linked to this wider
63philosophical trend. I should perhaps be very clear about the exact nature of my
64argument here. First, my claim is not that the philosophy of history is in a crisis.
65There has been a great deal going on in the philosophy of history since the
66discussions of the methodological status of historical explanations in the 1960s.1 My
67claim is rather that, as the philosophical climate changed, and philosophers got
68increasingly concerned with the ontological implications of the methodological
69autonomy of the special sciences, they also lost interest in the purely methodological
70debates about the structure of explanation that unfolded in the philosophy of history
71in mid-century. Secondly, it is not my goal here to offer an argument for or against a
72conceptual, as opposed to an ontological, understanding of the task of philosophical
73enquiry.2 My goal is somewhat more limited. It is to explore how the growing
1 The continuing success of History and Theory and the recent launch of the Journal of the Philosophy of
History, bear witness to this.
2 I have argued elsewhere that the ontological standpoint has difficulties in acknowledging the autonomy
of the sciences of mind. See my “Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind”, Inquiry, 48, 395–412. This
argument is also developed in a book manuscript in preparation From a Conceptual Point of View,
forthcoming.
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74interest in ontological questions in the latter half of the century has affected the
75philosophy of history. The declining fortunes of the philosophy of history in
76mainstream analytic philosophy, I argue, go hand in hand with a reversal of the order
77of priority concerning the relation between conceptual analysis and metaphysics. In
78the methodological discussions concerning the action/event distinction which took
79place in mid-century, questions of meaning were deemed to be logically prior to
80questions of truth and questions of metaphysics were linked to questions of method.
81The debate about the unity or heterogeneity of the sciences was not a debate about
82the metaphysical possibility of mental causation, but about what it means to explain
83something as an action or as an event. The debate was treated as a conceptual debate
84since the method of a science had to do justice to “what” the science sought to
85explain. By contrast, in the second half of the century, questions of truth come to be
86regarded as independent from questions of meaning. As a result, metaphysics is
87disconnected from methodology and reconnected with ontology. Furthermore, in a
88climate of prevailing naturalism, explanation proper comes to be identified with
89causal explanation and rationalisations are denied ontological import and deprived of
90genuine explanatory power. The return of ontology against the background of
91naturalism thus eliminates the gap between what there is (ontology) and the
92explanandum of natural science (i.e., what there is in the light of the investigative
93goals of natural science) and spells the demise of the purely conceptual nature of the
94action/event distinction that dominated the discussion in the mid-century.
95The Golden Age of the Philosophy of History
96The 1960s were a golden age for the philosophy of history. The autonomy of history
97was defended in the Anglo-American world by thinkers such as Collingwood3,
98Dray4, Von Wright5, Melden6, Wittgenstein7 and Winch8, to mention a few, as it had
99once been defended in continental thought by Dilthey, Rickert and Windelbandt. The
100latter defended the methodological autonomy of history on the ground that the
101events studied by history, as opposed to those investigated by the natural science, are
102unique and thus unpredictable. In the Anglo-American world, by contrast, the
103defence of the methodological autonomy of the historical sciences focussed on the
104normative character of mentalistic explanation. The historical sciences, it was
3 Collingwood, R. G., The Idea of History, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1946.
4 Dray, W. H. (1957). Laws and Explanations in History, London: Oxford University Press, 1957 and
“The Historical Explanation of Action Reconsidered”, in S. Hook (ed.). Philosophy and History, New
York: New York University Press, 1963.
5 Von Wright, G. H., Explanation and Understanding, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971.
6 Melden, A. I., Free Action, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961.
7 Wittgenstein, L. Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953 and The Blue and Brown
Books, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958.
8 Winch, P., The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, London: Routledge and Kegan
Paul, 1958 and “Understanding a Primitive Society”, American Philosophical Quarterly 1, (1964): 307–
324.
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105argued, are concerned not with events in nature, but with the domain of human
106affairs, that is, with rational processes or actions, and the explanation of action has a
107normative element that is absent from the explanation of events. Action explanation,
108it was claimed, is a species of justification, since it establishes a logical or conceptual
109relation between the explanans and the explanandum. To explain an action is not to
110subsume it under a general law derived from observations and empirical
111generalisation but to rationalise it or render it intelligible. To rationalise an action
112does not entail sharing the beliefs and goals of an agent but simply showing how the
113performance of a given action could be deductively derived from certain epistemic
114and motivational premises9. In the Anglo-American tradition the idea of rational
115reconstruction thus became the key to the thesis of the autonomy of history. Indeed
116some regarded the issue of uniqueness and lack of predictability as a red herring
117which distracted attention from what makes history a genuinely autonomous science.
118If poor predictive power were at the basis of the distinction between the natural and
119the human sciences, the distinction between the sciences of nature and mind would
120be merely a distinction in degree, not a distinction in kind, as Mill had indeed
121argued. According to Mill,10 the crucial distinction is not between the sciences of
122nature and mind but between the exact and inexact sciences, i.e. between those
123sciences in which strict deterministic predictions are possible and those in which
124they are not. Since for Mill the distinction between exact and inexact sciences cuts
125across the distinction between the sciences of nature and mind (meteorology and
126tidology, which are natural sciences, are also inexact sciences), the distinction
127between the sciences of nature and mind is not indicative of a significant rift
128between the method employed to investigate events and the method employed to
129study the thoughts and actions of human beings. The science of man is an inexact
130science, but it is nonetheless a science since it employs the same inductive method at
131work in the natural sciences. In the footsteps of R. G. Collingwood and against this
132Millian view, Dray argued that what makes history distinctive is not the fact that it
133investigates unique events with low level predictability, but that it is concerned with
134actions and that actions differ from events (the subject matter of natural science)
135because they are expressions of thought to be studied rationally rather than
136inductively. If history is to have an autonomous domain of enquiry, the distinction
137between the human and natural sciences must be a distinction in kind, not in degree.
138It is indeed a distinction in kind because the distinction between the natural and
139human sciences is a distinction between normative and descriptive sciences, not a
140distinction between exact and inexact sciences, as Mill claimed.
141This golden age of the philosophy of history was dominated by a non-reductivist
142consensus which came to be epitomised by the slogan “reasons are not causes”.
143During this period to be a non-reductivist was to be a non-causalist and to be a
9 The normativity at work in rational explanation is not specifically moral since there is no need to assume
the agent whose action one is trying to understand acts from morally praiseworthy principles; rational
explanation is nonetheless a species of justification since a chain of reasoning must be deductively valid in
order for the behaviour which expresses it to count as an action.
10 Mill, J. S. (1843) System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill,
J. M. Robson (ed.), Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
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144causalist was to be a reductivist. The reductivist (and thus the causalist) view was
145represented by Hempel, whose seminal 1942 essay, “The Function of General Laws
146in History”11 had galvanised the non-reductivist (non-causalist) opposition into
147action. Hempel argued that historical explanations are structurally isomorphic with
148explanations in natural science. They only appear to differ because historical
149explanations are mere “explanation sketches” or arguments with a suppressed
150general premise. Once the premise is made explicit, it becomes clear that
151explanations in history have the same logical structure as explanation in natural
152science and thus that there is a single concept of explanation applicable to both
153actions and events. It was in response to Hempel that Dray (as an interpreter of
154Collingwood), Melden, Von Wright Winch and others argued in favour of what came
155to be known as the “logical connection argument” according to which, since the
156relationship between the explanans and the explanandum in action explanation is
157logical or conceptual, reasons cannot be causes.
158Since in mid-century non-reductivism was virtually synonymous with non-
159causalism, to deny the logical connection argument or to assert that “reasons are
160causes” was tantamount to denying that history is an autonomous science with a
161distinctive domain of enquiry. This identification of non-reductivism with non-
162causalism was due to the fact that, in this period, the debate between causalists and
163non-causalists was essentially a methodological debate about the structure of
164explanation, not an ontological debate about the possibility of mental causation. The
165‘unity of the sciences’ was understood to mean, the methodological unity of the
166sciences. To deny the slogan “reasons are not causes” thus entailed abandoning non-
167reductivism. Both causalists, such as Hempel and Gardiner,12 and non-causalists,
168such as Dray, Melden and Von Wright, were agreed about the nature of the debate,
169that is, about its methodological nature and about the role of the philosopher in such
170a debate, even if they disagreed about the thesis of the unity or heterogeneity of the
171sciences. The role of the philosopher was to provide a second order reflection on the
172nature of explanation in different forms of enquiry and to assess whether such
173differences were distinctive enough to legitimise talk of different sciences. As we
174shall see, it is this consensus about the essentially methodological nature of the
175reasons/causes debate that came to be questioned in the latter part of the twentieth
176century and it is this questioning that eventually spelt the demise of the philosophy
177of history as a forum for the discussion of the relation between action and event
178explanation. As the debate acquired an ontological dimension which was absent
179from the methodological framework of the 1960s, discussions of the unity/disunity
180of the sciences and of the action/event distinction gradually moved from the
181philosophy of history and social science to the philosophy of mind and action, where
182they took the form of a debate about the metaphysical possibility of mental
183causation, rather than about the methodological autonomy of action explanation.
11 Hempel, C., “The Function of General Laws in History”, Journal of Philosophy, 39, 35–48, 1942. DOI
10.2307/2017635.
12 Gardiner, P., The Nature of Historical Explanation, Oxford University Press, 1952.
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184The Decline of Conceptual Analysis and the Rise of Ontology
185In the latter half of the twentieth century many came to question the purely
186methodological framework of the reductivism/non-reductivism debate that had
187dominated in mid century. Foremost amongst such critics is J. Kim, who denounced
188attempts to eschew the ontological dimension of the reasons/causes distinction as an
189attempt to find a quick and easy solution to the mind-body problem. Against the
190view that the relation between body and mind is a relation between explanatory
191practices, Kim argues as follows:
192One sort of reaction on the part of some philosophers to the re-emergence of
193mental causation as a philosophical problem is to try to dissipate it by arguing
194that there is in fact no such “problem”… It has been argued that worries about
195mental causation arise out of our misplaced philosophical priorities; that
196overindulgence in unmotivated metaphysical assumptions and arguments is the
197source of the unnecessary worries; that a misunderstanding of the logic and
198metaphysics of causation is at the core of the apparent troubles; that we should
199look to explanations and explanatory practices, not to metaphysics, for
200guidance on the matter of mental causation… These are what we might call
201“free lunch” solutions—or, if not free, at least pretty cheap ones.13
203Kim’s argument here is directed against the few existing contemporary
204proponents of the methodological thesis,14 but is equally an attack against the
205methodological conception of the reasons/cause debate that underpinned the logical
206connection argument.
207In a similar vein T. Crane argues that what is at stake in the reasons/causes debate
208is not the relation holding between different forms of explanation, but the relation
209between the methodological question of explanation and the ontological question of
210causation. The physicalist commitment to explanatory closure entails that not all
211explanations have ontological import and thus that some explanation must have a
212metaphysical edge over others:
213The issue is one about causation, not explanation. There are many ways of
214explaining events and processes in the physical world; but if the completeness
215of physics is true, then there is one special kind of cause. To state the problem,
216then, requires us to distinguish between causation and explanation, since the
217completeness of physics is a claim about causation.15
219Even more provocatively, E. Lepore and B. Lower dismiss the non-causalist
220consensus that underpinned a commitment to the logical connection argument as the
221“era of little red books”—a reference to the colour of the cover of the Routledge and
13 Kim, J., Mind in a Physical World, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1998, p. 59.
14 See Baker, L.R. “Metaphysics and Mental Causation”, in Mental Causation, edited by J. Heil and A.
Mele, Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993 and Burge, T. “Mind-Body Causation and Explanatory
Practice”, also in Mental Causation, edited by J. Heil and A. Mele. Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press,
1993.
15 Crane, T., Elements of Mind, Oxford University Press, 2001, p. 60.
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222Kegan Paul series in which Winch’s “The Idea of a Social Science” and similar
223oriented defences of the autonomy of social science explanation appeared:16
224During the heyday of neo-Wittgenstenian and Rylean philosophy of mind, the
225era of little red books, it was said that propositional attitude explanations are not
226causal explanations and that beliefs, intendings, imaginings, and the like are not
227even candidates to be causes. Indeed, to treat mentalistic language as describing
228causes or causal processes is, it was said, a logical error. We have come a long
229way since then. The work of Davidson, Armstrong, Putnam, and Fodor (among
230others) has reversed what was once the orthodoxy and it is now widely agreed
231that propositional attitude attributions describes states and episodes which enter
232into causal relations.17
234The received view of the latter half of the twentieth century is that the reasons/
235causes debate has an ontological dimension which was simply overlooked by a
236generation of philosophers in the grips of an ‘ordinary language’ fashion. The
237argument against the logical connection argument was given its first iconical
238formulation by Davidson in “Actions, Reasons and Causes”,18 an essay which has
239changed the way in which philosophers think about the very nature of the mind-body
240problem. It is to Davidson that I shall turn in the next section.
241Davidson and the New Face of Non-reductivism
242It was Davidson who changed the face of non-reductivism. In the mid twentieth-
243century to be a non-reductivist was tantamount to being a non-causalist. Since the
244debate was of a methodological nature, defending the autonomy of history entailed
245showing that the logical structure of action explanations differs from that of causal
246explanations. Once the work of conceptual clarification was done, the philosopher’s
247job was over. There were no residual ontological questions to be addressed.
248Davidson by contrast argued both a) that mentalistic explanations have a normative
249element that is absent from naturalistic explanations and thus that the sciences of
250mind are methodologically autonomous from the sciences of nature and b) that
251rational explanations are species of causal explanations, and as such, they are not
252ontologically inert. The first claim makes him a methodological non-reductivist, the
253second makes him a causalist. Davidson thus denied the slogan that “reasons are not
254causes” whilst still defending a form of non-reductivism. He claimed non-
255reductivism to be compatible with causalism.
256Davidson’s identification of reasons with causes was deemed to have two main
257advantages over the logical connection argument advocated by the previous
16 Graham MacDonald pointed out to me that the logical connection argument came to be referred as “The
Routledge and Kegan Paul” argument after the series which published the work of many of its exponents.
17 Lepore, E., and B. Lower, “More on Making Mind Matter” Philosophical Topics XVII (1), pp. 175–
191, 1989.
18 Davidson, D., “Actions, Reasons and Causes”. Journal of Philosophy, 60, 685–700, 1963. Reprinted in
his Essays on Actions and Events, Clarendon Press, 1980 and in A. R. Mele (ed.), The Philosophy of
Action, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, pp. 3–21.
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258generation of non-reductivists. First, the introduction of the notion of causally
259efficacious reasons seemed to be doing justice to the agent’s internal monologue. For
260the previous generation of non-reductivists to explain an action is to rationalise it, to
261provide reasons in the light of which the action could be rendered intelligible. Such a
262process of rational reconstruction appeared completely to bypass the agent’s own
263psychological processes. The introduction of the notion of causally efficacious
264reasons enabled Davidson to isolate the reasons which formed part of the agent’s
265internal monologue from mere rationalisations thereby doing justice to the first
266person perspective. Secondly and more importantly for the purposes of this
267discussion, Davidson’s identification of reasons with causes seemed to provide a
268solution to the problem of epiphenomenalism. Davidson argues that if reasons were
269not causes (as the previous generation of non-reductivists believed), rational
270explanations would remain metaphysically inert. If, as supporters of the logical
271connection argument claimed, the relation between the explanans and the
272explanandum in mentalistic explanations is purely logical or conceptual, then
273rational explanations are propositions which express, to use a Humean phrase,
274relations of ideas and, as such lack existential or ontological import.19
275Davidson agrees with a previous generation of non-reductivists that the sciences
276of mind are methodologically autonomous. In this respect he sides with Dray,
277Melden, Von Wright and others against Hempel. On the other hand, Davidson
278disagrees with the previous generation of non-reductivists because he believed they
279failed to address the problem of mental causation, thereby ignoring the ontological
280dimension of the action/event distinction. Yet, to say that the older generation of
281non-reductivists failed to address the ontological dimension of the action/event
282distinction is to beg the very question at issue, i.e., whether the debate is of an
283ontological rather than a conceptual nature. The older generation of non-reductivists
284would have argued that, far from neglecting the ontological dimension of the mind-
285body problem, they had deliberately refrained from answering the metaphysical
286question of mental causation since answering such a question required applying the
287explanations of one science to the explanandum of another, thereby committing a
288category mistake. In other words, the older generation of non-reductivists would
289have argued that their refusal to address the question of mental causation was not a
290failure to engage with ontology, but a principled choice grounded in the belief that
291since method and metaphysics are intimately related, existential questions must be
292addressed within a prior horizon of meaning. Davidson’s claim that the earlier
293generation had neglected the ontological dimension of the action/event distinction is
294ultimately due to the fact that he does not share the conception of philosophy as a
295form of conceptual analysis that informed the defence of non-reductivism in the mid-
296twentieth century. To endorse Davidson’s objection therefore, one must be prepared
297to reject the conception of philosophy as a second order reflection on first order
298knowledge and to be willing to ascribe a different role to it.
19 I have discussed the alleged advantages of Davidson’s causalist position vis-à-vis the logical connection
argument in several essays including “Collingwood, Psychologism and Internalism”, European Journal of
Philosophy 12:2, 2004, pp. 163–177; “Two Dogmas of Contemporary Philosophy of Action”, Journal of
the Philosophy of History 1, pp. 11–26, 2007 and “In Defence of the Agent-Centred Perspective”,
Metaphilosophy 36, pp. 652–667, 2005. DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9973.2005.00398.x.
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299Davidson develops his non-reductivism within the framework of a naturalistic
300conception of reality which grants ontological priority to the explanatory framework
301of natural science.20 Davidson, in other words, presupposes that explanation proper
302is causal because only causal as opposed to rational explanations have existential
303import. Assuming that natural science explanations have the ontological edge over
304other forms of explanation, Davidson asks how is it possible to justify our
305commitment to the ontological priority of scientific explanation with our continued
306employment of rational explanations. He ruled out both interactionist dualism and
307psychophysical parallelism as possible solutions to the mind-body problem and
308argued instead for a form of dual-aspect monism according to which mental events
309are causally efficacious in so far as they are described as physical events. Mental
310events may thus be seen as causally efficacious (not epiphenomenal) in a way that
311does not interfere with the modern scientific commitment to the completeness of
312physics. Davidson’s ‘anomalous monism’ seeks to solve the problem of the
313epiphenomenality of the mental which, in his view, plagued the non-reductivism
314of the older generation, without violating the assumption so dear to most
315contemporary physicalists, namely the causal closure of the physical.21 Many have
316been unpersuaded by Davidson’s solution, but most, if not all, have been persuaded
317by his overall approach to the problem and have accepted that any defence of the
318non-reducibility of action to event explanation must account for how is it possible to
319do justice to the autonomy of the mental against the background of a naturalistic
320conception of reality. In this respect Davidson’s contribution has been extremely
321influential for he has transformed the very nature of the problem posed by the action/
322event distinction from a purely conceptual problem about the nature of explanation
323to a metaphysical problem about the possibility of mental causation. Thus, although
324Davidson may have failed to convince many that he found a solution to the problem
325of mental causation,22 he has been extremely successful in determining the kind of
326questions that ought to be addressed and thereby in changing the understanding of
327the philosopher’s role from that of reflecting on the nature of explanation in different
20 The metaphysical underpinnings of Davidson’s non-reductivism are developed in his “Mental Events”
in Essays on Actions and Events, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
21 I have argued elsewhere that the problem of epiphenomenalism is generated by Davidson’s ontological
approach in conjunction with a layered view of science in which rational explanations are said to
supervene upon causal explanations. See “Idealism and the Philosophy of Mind” Inquiry 48/5, 2005, pp
395–412. DOI 10.1080/00201740500241847.
22 Some argue that anomalous monism is vulnerable to the charge of epiphenomenalism. For the
epiphenomenalist objection see Honderich, T., “The Argument for Anomalous Monism”, Analysis 42,
1982, pp. 59–64 and “Smith the Champion of Mauve”, Analysis 44, 1984, pp. 86–87. See also Sosa, E.,
“Mind-Body Interaction and Supervenient Causation” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9, 1984, pp. 271–81.
Others argue that anomalous monism must either accept epiphenomenalism or reckon with the problem of
explanatory exclusion. This dilemma has been explored by Kim, J., “The Myth of Non-reductive
Materialism”, Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association 63, 1989, pp. 31–47; Kim. J.,
“Explanatory Exclusion and the Problem of Mental Causation”, in Information, Semantics and
Epistemology, edited by E. Villanueva. Cambridge Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, 1990; Kim, J. “The
Nonreductivist’s Trouble with Mental Causation”, in Supervenience and the Mind, Cambridge University
Press, 1995; Sosa, E., “Davidson’s Thinking Causes” in Mental Causation edited by J. Heil and A. Mele,
Oxford: Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993.
Philosophia
JrnlID 11406_ArtID 9135_Proof# 1 - 26/04/2008
The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com
The Ontological Backlash: Why did Mainstream Analytic Philosophy Lose Interest in the Philosophy of History? 
D'Oro G 
PHILOSOPHIA 36(4):403-415 Dec 2008  
AUTHOR'S PROOF
U
N
C
O
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
328domains of enquiry to that of accommodating folk-psychological explanations
329within the conception of reality that dominates the natural sciences.
330In the latter half of the century the convergence of a renewed interest in ontology
331and the prevailing perspective of natural science has led to a very different
332understanding of what is required to defend the autonomy of the special sciences.
333Whilst in the methodological debates which occurred in mid-century defending the
334autonomy of history required showing that history has a distinctive method that is
335non-reducible to explanation in natural science, in the second half of the century to
336defend the autonomy of history entails showing how it is possible to maintain certain
337conceptual and methodological distinctions in the light of a non negotiable
338commitment to the ontology of natural science. Davidson was a leading figure in
339this new Zeitgeist. He changed the face of non-reductivism because he did not share
340the conception of philosophy which united the previous generation of non-
341reductivists. His non-reductivism is developed not against the background of a
342conception of philosophy as offering a meta-level reflection on first order sciences,
343but against the backdrop of a conception of philosophy as the underlabourer of
344science whose task is to account for how certain methodological and conceptual
345distinctions may still be possible in the context of the ontological priority of natural
346science.
347In the early 1960s the philosophy of action had yet to be recognised as a
348distinctive area of philosophy. As we have seen, the action/event distinction was
349firmly located within the philosophy of history and the philosophy of the social
350science. With the publication of “Actions, Reasons and Causes” the so-called
351verstehen/erklären debate had found a new home in a freshly established branch of
352philosophy. Yet, as the debate moved from the philosophy of history to the
353philosophy of action, it also changed from a methodological debate about the
354structure of explanation in the sciences of mind and nature to an ontological debate
355about the possibility of mental causation. Davidson was largely responsible for
356altering the terms of the debate and for setting the new philosophical agenda. After
357Davidson, and indeed as a result of Davidson, reductivists and non-reductivists are
358no longer to be found on either side of the causalist/non-causalist divide since non-
359reductivism is no longer associated with an essentially methodological claim. In
360spite of being the principal architect of a new causalist consensus uniting reductivists
361and non-reductivists alike, Davidson still remains faithful to a central tenet of the
362logical connection argument for he kept alive the idea that the sciences of mind are
363distinctive because mentalistic explanations have a normative dimension that finds
364no echo in the natural world. In fact, whilst non-reductivism has dominated the
365philosophy of mind in the latter half of the twentieth century many of the non-
366reductivist positions available have failed to do justice to the kind of problematics
367that inspired the defence of the autonomy of the sciences of mind articulated by
368Collingwood, Dray, Melden and others. The most widespread form of non-
369reductivism, the kind of multiple realisation functionalism espoused by Putnam23
23 Putnam, H., “The Nature of Mental States” in H. Putnam, Collected Papers II, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975.
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370and Fodor,24 flatly fails to acknowledge the existence of a distinction in kind
371between the sciences of nature and mind. Psychology, for Fodor, differs from
372physics not because it is a normative science but because psychological laws, unlike
373those of the basic sciences, are hedged by ceteris paribus clauses.25 For Fodor, as
374indeed for Mill, the crucial distinction is not between psychology and physics, but
375between physics and the rest of the special sciences. Fodor, very much like Mill
376before him, regards the sciences of mind as empirical sciences on a par with other
377special sciences such as geology, and claims that psychology, like the rest of the
378special sciences, is to be distinguished from physics not because it is normative but
379because its laws are incapable of yielding precise predictions. Thus, although
380Davidson rejected the purely methodological dimension of the reasons/causes
381debate, he did not reject the view, characteristic of the first generation of non-
382reductivists, that the distinction between the sciences of mind and nature is a
383distinction in kind rather than in degree, and thus the view that there is a genuine
384methodological distinction to be reckoned with, whatever one’s metaphysical
385commitments might be.
386Ontological Seriousness and Honest Philosophizing
387The contemporary consensus is that philosophy must take the ontological, not the
388conceptual point of view. As John Heil puts it:
389The twentieth century was not kind to metaphysics. In the English speaking
390world metaphysics was deflated by neo-Kantians, logical positivists, logical
391empiricists, as well as philosophers who regarded the study of ordinary
392language as a fitting replacement for traditional philosophical pursuits.
393Elsewhere philosophers promoting phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existen-
394tialists creeds showed themselves equally disdainful of tradition. Metaphysical
395talk was replaced by talk about metaphysical talk; concern with conceptual
396schemes and patterns of ontological commitment supplanted concern with
397ontology… I want only to note the inescapability of ontology. Honest
398philosophy requires what the Australians call ontological seriousness.26
400The decline of interest in the philosophy of history within mainstream analytic
401philosophy, I have argued, is linked to this ontological backlash against the
402conceptual standpoint that dominated the early generation of non-reductivists. It is
403because the mind-body debate as discussed within the philosophy of history and
404social science entailed taking the conceptual point of view that the discipline is no
405longer at the centre of contemporary discussions. If this story is correct, the debate
24 See Fodor J. A., “Making Mind Matter More”, Philosophical Topics XVII, pp. 59–79, 1989 and
“Special Sciences: Still Autonomous after All These Years”, Philosophical Perspectives 11, 149–63, 1997.
25 See Fodor 1989.
26 Heil, J., From an Ontological Point of View, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003, p. 1–2.
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406between the first and second generation of non-reductivists goes to the very heart of
407philosophy since choosing one approach or the other entails making quite significant
408decisions about the relation between method, meaning and metaphysics. Should
409metaphysics be identified with ontology and disconnected from questions of
410meaning and method? Those who dismiss the purely conceptual nature of the
411action/event distinction tend to do so because they share a conception of philosophy
412as an essentially ontological enquiry. Yet, whether metaphysics should be identified
413with ontology and disconnected from questions of meaning and method, as Heil
414claims, or whether metaphysics should be disconnected from ontology and
415connected with method and meaning in the manner of either Kant’s metaphysics
416of experience or Collingwood’s metaphysics of absolute presuppositions,27 is exactly
417what is at stake in the transition from the first to the second generation of non-
418reductivists. It certainly should not be enough to proclaim that serious philosophis-
419ing requires taking the ontological point of view without further ado. What is
420required is a serious engagement between the ontological and the conceptual point
421view, an honest attempt to establish what is the order of priority between logic and
422ontology, method and metaphysics, truth and meaning. Without a serious
423engagement with these fundamental questions the call for ontological seriousness
424will remain ungrounded, and its exponents could indeed be charged with being in the
425grip of a new philosophical fashion.
426The thesis of this paper has been primarily descriptive. I have not argued in
427favour of a particular conception of the philosophy of history or in any way tried to
428dictate what its subject matter is or should be. I have simply tried to show (1) that the
429debate concerning the relation between action and event explanation, which in the
4301960s was firmly lodged in the philosophy of history, has migrated to the philosophy
431of mind and action; (2) that in the course of this migration the debate has changed
432from one addressing the methodological autonomy of action explanation to one
433addressing the metaphysical possibility of mental causation and (3) that as the view
434that no solution to a philosophical problem should omit a discussion of its
435ontological commitments took hold, mainstream analytic philosophy lost interest in
436the generation of non-reductivists who sought to defend the non-reducibility of
437action explanation to event explanation by arguing that history has an autonomous
438domain of enquiry that is distinct from that of the natural sciences.
439Nonetheless, it would be inappropriate to conclude this discussion without
440addressing a possible objection that may be raised against the conception of the task
441of the philosophy of history presupposed by philosophers such as Collingwood and
442Dray. It could be argued that there is more to the subject matter of history than
443actions, and that the range of questions addressed by the philosophy of history goes
444far beyond the conceptual issues which are captured by the reasons/causes debate.
445This complaint is understandable. When doing philosophy we distinguish on the one
446hand between the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of
27 Collingwood, R. G., An Essay on Metaphysics, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940; revised edition, with an
introduction by Rex Martin, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.
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447religion, the philosophy of history and, on the other, between conceptual analysis,
448ontology and epistemology. These distinctions carve the territory in very different
449ways. The philosophy of mind, the philosophy of religion and the philosophy of
450science cover a range of conceptual, ontological and epistemological problems. This
451is the case also with the philosophy of history which is concerned not only with
452conceptual questions of the kind outlined in this paper but also with a range of
453epistemological challenges which arise from the fact that the past, unlike the present,
454is not available for observation and that historical explanations must rely on
455evidence.28 Whether the philosophy of history is primarily a hermeneutic enterprise
456concerned with the interpretation of actions or an epistemological venture whose
457goal is to show how we acquire knowledge of the past is, it seems to me, a debate
458internal to the philosophy of history in the way in which the question as to whether
459the mind–body problem is a problem about the interaction of distinct ontological
460substances, an epistemological problem arising from the fact that we have very
461different modes of access to our mental and physical states, or a problem about the
462relationship between normative and descriptive sciences, is a debate that reflects
463very different conceptions of the nature of the mind–body problem within the
464philosophy of mind. Those philosophers such as Collingwood and Dray, who
465articulated a non-reductivist thesis within the philosophy of history, believed that the
466contrast between the past and the present fails to delineate a subject matter for
467historical enquiry that is sufficiently distinct from that of the natural sciences and
468thus argued that the relevant distinction to be made in order to safeguard the
469autonomy of historical explanation is not between the past and the present, but
470between actions and events and their respective modes of explanations: rational and
471causal. For philosophers such as Collingwood and Dray history is an autonomous
472science not in so far as it deals with the past rather than the present but in so far as it
473is concerned with the interpretation of actions rather than the causal explanation of
474events. History, in their view, has a distinctive domain of enquiry because it is a
475hermeneutic science. My goal here, however, was not to take sides in a debate within
476the philosophy history in support of the view that history is a primarily a
477hermeneutic science, but rather to show that whether or not the identification of
478historical explanations with rational explanations is correct, the thesis that action
479explanations are rational explanations, which are conceptually irreducible to event
480explanations, struck a note with the wider philosophical community and brought the
481philosophy of history to the attention of mainstream analytic philosophy.
482Conversely, I have argued, interest in the philosophy of history waned as the
483philosophical Zeitgeist changed and the generation of non-reductivists who
484construed the action/event distinction in purely conceptual terms, thus refusing to
485go beyond a purely methodological dimension of the reasons/causes debate, were
486deemed to be evading the metaphysical dimension of the action/event distinction and
487were consequently accused of ontological escapism.
28 Some indeed might go so far as identifying the philosophy of history with a “branch of epistemology”.
See A. Tucker, Our Knowledge of the Past, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 11.
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